lenzuela, if possible, on [date deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines
[CIA agent] will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves
by Genl Viaux (of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant). 3. CIA false-flagger]
who briefed COS evening [date del] Oct, promised attempt to contact Valenzuela
[deleted] . . . will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux, without RPT without
promising Viaux USG support for any later move. (FYI: [COS] relieved to learn
[CIA asset] not goading on Viaux, which [we] would view as height of folly).
4. Urge you do not convey impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting,
let alone triggering coup attempts. [34]
The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by the CIA
agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable of fully controlling
the Chilean officers they contacted. The message had already been passed that
the United States favored military intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives
did not w
